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For any non-trivial voting system, there exists manipulable situations where a
coalition of voters, by casting an insincere ballot, may secure an outcome that is
better from their point of view. In this paper, we investigate how it is possible to
reduce the manipulability rate, which is the probability of such situations in a given
culture, i.e. a probabilistic structure of the population.
We prove that when electors are independent, the culture meets a condition that we
call decomposability. And when this condition is met, for any voting system that uses
more complex ballots than orders of preferences (for example grades), there exists
a “reasonable” voting system that depends only on orders of preference and whose
manipulability rate is at most as high.
Combining this result with Condorcification theorem from Durand et al. (2014)
and Green-Armytage et al. (2014), we conclude that when searching for a “reasonable”
voting system whose manipulability is minimal, one can restrict to those that depend
only on orders of preference and meet the Condorcet criterion.
JEL code: D71.
∗The work presented in this paper has been carried out at LINCS (www.lincs.fr).
I Introduction
I.A Motivation
A desirable property of a voting system would be that any voter, after having
determined her opinions, has at her disposal a ballot that best defends her views,
whatever the other voters do. If it is not the case, as C. L. Dodgson noticed
(cited by Black, 1958), voting becomes “more of a game of skill than a real test
of the wishes of the voters.”
Unfortunately, Gibbard (1973) proved that any non-dictatorial voting sys-
tem with three eligible candidates or more is manipulable; that is, at least one
voter does not always have an undominated strategy. Although this result is fre-
quently cited under the form of Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Satterthwaite,
1975), which deals only with voting systems depending on orders of preference,
it is worth remembering that Gibbard’s fundamental theorem applies to any
game form, where available strategies may be objects of any kind, including
grades for example.
Despite this negative result, all voting systems are not equal when it comes
to manipulation. Several indicators of coalitional manipulability have been de-
fined and studied, for example by Saari (1990), Smith (1999), Slinko (2004) and
Tideman (2006). A very common one is the manipulability rate, which is the
probability that a situation is coalitionaly manipulable, under a given assump-
tion about the probabilistic structure of the population, or culture. It is an
important indicator because it is an upper bound for most of the others: if we
could identify voting systems with close-to-zero manipulability rates in realistic
cultures, then the impact of manipulability would be tolerable.
Several authors have used a theoretical approach (Lepelley and Mbih, 1987,
1994; Lepelley and Valognes, 1999; Smith, 1999; Favardin et al., 2002; Lepel-
ley and Valognes, 2003; Favardin and Lepelley, 2006; Lepelley et al., 2008),
computer simulations (Lepelley and Mbih, 1987; Pritchard and Wilson, 2007;
Green-Armytage, 2011, 2014; Green-Armytage et al., 2014) or experimental re-
sults (Chamberlin et al., 1984; Tideman, 2006; Green-Armytage et al., 2014) to
evaluate the manipulability rates of several voting systems, according to various
assumptions about the structure of the population.
To the best of our knowledge, the first general theoretical result that allows
to reduce the manipulability rate has been shown independently by Durand
et al. (2012, 2014) and Green-Armytage et al. (2014). It states that if a vot-
ing system meets the “informed majority coalition criterion”, then forcing it to
respect Condorcet criterion makes its less manipulable, in the sense of the inclu-
sion of manipulable situations. Hence, for any culture, the “condorcified” voting
system has a lower manipulability rate than the original one.
Recently, special attention has been paid to voting systems that are not based
on orders of preference, such as Majority Judgment. According to Balinski and
Laraki (2010), one of their objectives is a kind of resistance to manipulation.
However, simulations results by Green-Armytage et al. (2014) suggest that vot-
ing systems based on grades perform quite badly in terms of manipulation.
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In this paper, we investigate this question from a theoretical point of view:
given a voting system based on more information than orders of preferences, for
example grades, is it always outperformed by a well-chosen voting system that
depends only on orders of preference?
I.B Contributions and plan
In section II, we present our general framework and recall previous results.
In II.A, we recall the definition of an electoral space from Durand et al.
(2014). This framework allows to study any kind of voting system, including
those that may depend on grades, approval values or other objects. Then we
complete this framework by defining the notion of culture, a probabilistic mea-
sure over the possible states of opinion for the population of voters.
In II.B, we recall the definition of state-based voting system, also from Durand
et al. (2014). Is has been shown by Moulin (1978) and Durand et al. (2014) that,
for the purpose of reducing manipulability, we can restrict our study to such
voting systems. Then we definemanipulability in general, and themanipulability
rate of a voting system in a given culture.
In II.C, we recall the Condorcification theorem from Durand et al. (2014) and
Green-Armytage et al. (2014): if a voting system meets the informed majority
coalition criterion, then its Condorcification is at most as manipulable as the
original system.
Section III contains the contributions of this paper.
In III.A, for any voting system, we define its slices, each of them being a
voting system that depends only on binary relations of preference. Furthermore,
if the original system meets the Condorcet criterion, then so does any of its slices.
In III.B, we define a criterion for the culture of the population: decompos-
ability. We prove, in particular, that it is met when voters are independent.
In III.C, we prove the main result of this paper, the slicing theorem: when
the probabilized electoral space is decomposable, then for any voting system f ,
at least one of its slices has a manipulability rate that is at most as high as f .
In III.D, we conclude by combining both results, Condorcification and slicing
theorems. In order to minimize manipulability, we show that we can restrict
our search to voting systems that:
• Depend only on binary relations of preference,
• And meet the Condorcet criterion.
Finally, we remark that for any decomposable culture, such an “optimal” voting
system exists.
In appendix A, the reader will find a glossary of the main notations used in
this paper. Other appendices contains some developments that can be skipped
at first reading: appendix B gives theoretical foundations for the notion of
decomposability and appendix C investigates whether some generalizations of
the main theorem are possible.
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II General framework and previous results
In this section, we present our general framework. For greater details about
the notions of electoral space and state-based voting system, see Durand et al.
(2014).
II.A Electoral space
For n ∈ N \ {0}, we note Vn = {1, . . . , n} the set of the indexes of voters,
called simply voters in the following. For m ∈ N\{0}, we note Cm = {1, . . . ,m}
the set of the indexes of the candidates1.
In order to model preferences, we need to recall a few definitions about
binary relations. Most of the ones in this paper represent the strict preferences
of a voter and are generally supposed to be antisymmetric, so we will use the
“strict” notation , even when relaxing the assumption of antisymmetry for the
sake of mathematical generality.
Let E be a set, r ∈ P(E2) a binary relation and (c, d) ∈ E2. We note:
• c r d if and only if (iff) (c, d) ∈ r;
• c ≺r d iff c r d and d r c;
• c 6≺r d iff not(c r d) and not(d r c);
• c Ïr d iff c r d and not(d r c).
Let us remark that if relation r is antisymmetric, which will be assumed in most
models, then there are only three mutually exclusive possibilities: c r d (which
is equivalent to c Ïr d in this case), d r c and c 6≺r d.
We say that relation r is:
• Irreflexive iff ∀c ∈ E,not(c r c);
• Antisymmetric iff ∀(c, d) ∈ E2, c 6= d and c r d⇒ not(d r c);
• Complete2 iff ∀(c, d) ∈ E2, c 6= d and not(d r c)⇒ c r d;
• Transitive iff ∀(c, d, e) ∈ E3, c r d and d r e⇒ c r e;
• Negatively transitive iff ∀(c, d, e) ∈ E3,not(c r d) and not(d r e) ⇒
not(c r e);
• A strict weak order iff it is negatively transitive, irreflexive and antisym-
metric;
• A strict total order iff it is transitive, irreflexive (hence antisymmetric)
and complete.
For m ∈ N \ {0}, we note Rm = P(Cm2) the set of the binary relations
over Cm: an element of this set allows to represent a voter’s binary relation of
preference over the candidates. For (n,m) ∈ (N \ {0})2, we note R = Rmn: an
element of R represents the binary relations of preference of the whole popula-
tion of voters.
Throughout this paper, we will illustrate our results with an example of
model that allows to study most classical voting systems. In this specific model,
each voter i is capable of mentally establishing:
1.Candidates can be or not be voters themselves, without impact on our results.
2.We could say weakly complete because this definition does not require c r c.
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• A strict weak order of preference ri over the candidates,
• A vector ui ∈ [0, 1]m of grades over the candidates3,
• A vector ai ∈ {0, 1}m of approval values over the candidates.
The triple ωi = (ri, ui, ai) will be called her state and we will note Ri the
function that extracts the first element of this triple: Ri(ωi) = Ri(ri, ui, ai) = ri.
To be more general, we now define a class of models, called electoral spaces,
that allow to study any kind of voting system, with virtually any assumptions
about the structure of each voter’s opinions.
Definition II.1 (ES, electoral space). An electoral space, or ES, is given by:
• A number of voters n ∈ N \ {0} and a number of candidates m ∈ N \ {0},
• For each voter i ∈ Vn, a non-empty set Ωi of her possible states,
• For each voter i ∈ Vn, a function Ri : Ωi → Rm, which allows to know
the binary relation of preference associated to her state.
We note Ω =
∏
i∈Vn Ωi: it is the set of possible states for the whole pop-
ulation. We note R = (R1, . . . , Rn) the n-tuple of all functions Ri; by a
slight abuse of notation, R will also denote the function that, to any situa-
tion ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn) ∈ Ω, associates the n-tuple (R1(ω1), . . . , Rn(ωn)), which
gives each voter’s binary relation of preference.
Such an electoral space is denoted (n,m,Ω, R), or just Ω when there is no
ambiguity.
Back to our example, we might want to assume that a voter’s state has some
form of inner coherence: for example, if voter i strictly prefers candidate c to
d, i.e. if c ri d, we could demand that her grade (resp. her approval value)
for c is no lower than her one for d, i.e. ui(c) ≥ ui(d) (resp. ai(c) ≥ ai(d)). To
embed this assumption in our model, we simply have to define Ωi as the set of
triples (ri, ui, ai) that meet this assumption4.
Here is another example: in some studies about voting, a voter’s opinion
is only represented by a strict total order over the candidates. This model
simply corresponds to the choice of the electoral space of strict total orders (for
n and m), where each Ωi is the set Sm of strict total orders and each Ri is the
identity function.
In definition II.1, binary relations of preference Ri(ωi) are not supposed
to be antisymmetric: this is discussed in Durand et al. (2014). If the reader
feels uncomfortable with this, she may read the following with an additional
assumption of antisymmetry in mind.
For probabilistic notions, such as the manipulability rate, we will have to
deal with measurable sets, which are constituted by a set E and a sigma-algebra
τE over E. Such a measurable set is denoted (E, τE), or just E when there is
no ambiguity.
The set Rm of binary relations over Cm will always be endowed with its
discrete sigma-algebra, which we will denote τRm .
3.We could demand that grades belong to a finite subset of [0, 1] for practical applications,
but our results hold true with or without this assumption.
4. In fact, our results hold true in both models: with or without this additional assumption.
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When we consider a Cartesian product E of measurable spaces (Ei, τEi), we
will always endow it with its product sigma-algebra. For example, the set R
will be endowed with the product sigma-algebra τR =
∏
i∈Vn τRm = (τRm)
n,
which is simply its discrete sigma-algebra.
Definition II.2 (MES, measurable electoral space). A measurable electoral
space, or MES, is given by an electoral space (n,m,Ω, R) and, for each voter
i ∈ Vn, a sigma-algebra τΩi over Ωi, such that the function Ri is measurable.
We will note τΩ =
∏
i∈Vn τΩi the product sigma-algebra over Ω.
Such an MES is denoted (n,m,Ω, τΩ, R), or just Ω.
Definition II.3 (PES, probabilized electoral space). A probabilized electoral
space, or PES, is given by a measurable electoral space (n,m,Ω, τΩ, R) and a
probability measure P over Ω, called culture.
Such a PES is denoted (n,m,Ω, τΩ, R,P), or just (Ω,P).
When considering a PES, we will note µ the probability law of R.
For example, let us consider our reference electoral space where ωi = (ri, ui, ai).
Let us endow each Ωi with the product sigma-algebra of the discrete one on Rm,
Lebesgue sigma-algebra on [0, 1]m and the discrete one on {0, 1}m. Then each
function Ri is obviously measurable. Hence, Ω is a measurable electoral space.
Independently for each voter, let us draw uniformly a point ui in [0, 1]m.
Let us define ri as the strict weak order of preference such that c ri d iff
ui(c) > ui(d). And for each candidate c, let us take ai(c) to be the rounding of
ui(c) to the closest integer (rounded up). Then we have defined an example of
culture P, i.e. a probability measure over the electoral space Ω.
II.B Voting system and manipulability
Generally, a voting system can be quite complex: for example, it can involve
a multi-round process. But it has been shown by Moulin (1978) and Durand
et al. (2014) that, in order to reduce manipulability, we can restrict our study
to state-based voting systems.
Definition II.4 (state-based voting system, SBVS). Let Ω be an ES.
A state-based voting system over Ω, or SBVS, is a function:
f :
∣∣∣∣∣ Ω → Cm(ω1, . . . , ωn) → f(ω1, . . . , ωn).
For example, let us consider one of the possible variants for the voting system
called Range voting, in our reference electoral space where ωi = (ri, ui, ai).
• Each voter i communicates a state belonging to Ωi;
• We say that she votes sincerely iff she communicates her true state ωi;
• Function f takes into account only the vectors of grades communicated
by the voters, then returns the candidate with highest total grade (and
resolves ties in an arbitrary deterministic way).
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Definition II.5 (manipulability). As is usually done in the literature, we say
that a voting system ismanipulable in a given situation iff there exists a coalition
of voters who, by misrepresenting their states, may secure an outcome that is
different from the sincere winner and that they all prefer to her, while assuming
that other voters still vote sincerely.
Formally, let Ω be an ES and f an SBVS.
For (ω, ψ) ∈ Ω2, we say that f is manipulable in situation ω towards ψ iff:{
f(ψ) 6= f(ω),
∀i ∈ Vn, ψi 6= ωi ⇒ f(ψ) Ri(ωi) f(ω).
For ω ∈ Ω, we say that f is manipulable in situation ω iff ∃ψ ∈ Ω s.t. f is
manipulable in situation ω towards ψ.
The manipulability indicator of f is the function:
Mf :
Ω → {0, 1}
ω → 1 if f is manipulable in ω,
0 otherwise.
When (Ω,P) is a PES, we call manipulability rate of f for P (provided Mf
is measurable):
ρP(f) = P(f is manipulable in ω)
=
∫
ω∈Ω
Mf (ω)P(dω).
II.C Condorcification
Now, we recall the Condorcification theorem from Durand et al. (2014),
which gives a first way to reduce manipulability for a large class of voting sys-
tems.
Definition II.6 (Condorcet winner). Let Ω be an ES, ω ∈ Ω and z ∈ Cm.
We say that z is Condorcet winner in ω iff z has a strict victory5 against
any other candidate c; that is:
∀c ∈ Cm \ {z},

card{i ∈ Vn s.t. z Ri(ωi) c} >
n
2
,
card{i ∈ Vn s.t. c Ri(ωi) z} ≤
n
2
.
(1)
(2)
If relations Ri(ωi) are antisymmetric, which is the case in most models, then
this definition amounts to condition (1) only.
5. Since we demand victories based on more than half voters, and not only more voters
than the opponent, our definition of Condorcet winner coincides with the one commonly found
in the literature when preferences are strict total orders, but may differ otherwise. See Durand
et al. (2014) for more details.
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Definition II.7 (two criteria for an SBVS). Let Ω be an ES and f an SBVS.
We say that f meets the Condorcet criterion iff, for any ω ∈ Ω and z ∈ Cm,
if z is a Condorcet winner in ω, then f(ω) = z.
We say that f meets the informed majority coalition criterion iff any ma-
jority coalition, that is informed of what the other voters do, may decide of the
outcome. That is, ∀ω ∈ Ω,∀M ∈ P(Vn), if card(M) > n2 then ∀c ∈ Cm:
∃ψ ∈ Ω s.t
{
f(ψ) = c,
∀i ∈ Vn \M, ψi = ωi.
Durand et al. (2014) show that most classical voting systems from the lit-
erature meet the informed majority coalition criterion: all those meeting the
Condorcet criterion, plurality, two-round system, Instant-Runoff Voting, Buck-
lin method, Borda count, Coombs method, approval voting, range voting.
Definition II.8 (Condorcification). Let Ω be an ES and f an SBVS.
We call Condorcification of f the state-based voting system:
f c :
Ω → Cm
ω → if ω has a Condorcet winner z, then z,
otherwise, f(ω).
Now, we recall the main result from Durand et al. (2014).
Theorem II.9 (Condorcification). Let Ω be an ES and f an SBVS. We suppose
that f meets the informed majority coalition criterion.
Then its Condorcification f c is at most as manipulable as f :
{ω ∈ Ω s.t. f c is manipulable in ω} ⊆ {ω ∈ Ω s.t. f is manipulable in ω}.
As a consequence, for any probability measure P over Ω, we have (provided
Mf and Mfc are measurable):
ρP(f
c) ≤ ρP(f).
III Slicing
In this section, for any voting system, we define its slices, each of them being
a voting system that depends only on binary relations of preference. Then we
introduce the notion of decomposable culture, which is proven to be a more
general condition than probabilistic independence of voters. We prove our main
result: when the culture is decomposable, for any voting system, one of its slices
is at most as manipulable as the original system. Finally, we combine this result
with the Condorcification theorem.
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III.A Slices of a voting system
Here, we define what is a slice of a voting system f . The idea is the follow-
ing: when voter i communicates her binary relation of preference ri, we use a
predefined rule, denoted yi, to reconstitute a fictional state ω′i that is coherent
with ri. Then we apply f to these fictional states (ω′1, . . . , ω′n).
For example, in our reference electoral space where ωi = (ri, ui, ai), let us
consider yi(ri) = (ri, u′i, a′i), where u′i is the vector of Borda scores6 associated
to ri and a′i is an approval vector with 1 for each candidate.
In the slice of Range voting by y = (y1, . . . , yn), once voters have commu-
nicated binary relations of preference r = (r1, . . . , rn), we use y = (y1, . . . , yn)
in order to reconstitute fictional states, then we apply Range Voting to these
states. Finally, the winner is obviously the candidate with highest total Borda
score. Hence, the slice of Range voting by y is simply the Borda method.
Of course, Range voting has many other slices, depending on the choice of y.
We now give the formal definitions.
Notations III.1 (space Y). When Ω is an ES, for each voter i, we note:
Yi = {yi : Ri(Ωi)→ Ωi s.t. Ri ◦ yi = Id}.
It is the set of right inverses of Ri (corestricted to its image), i.e. functions yi
that, to each possible ri, associate a state ω′i = yi(ri) that is an antecedent of
ri by Ri.
We note Y = ∏ni=1 Yi. For r = (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ ∏i∈Vn Ri(Ωi) and y =
(y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Y, we note y(r) = (y1(r1), . . . , yn(rn)) ∈ Ω.
When Ω is an MES, the set ΩiRi(Ωi) of functions from Ri(Ωi) to Ωi has
a canonical sigma-algebra: associating each function to the list of its values,
consider the product sigma-algebra τΩi × . . . × τΩi , with a number of factors
equal to the cardinal of Ri(Ωi). Space Yi, as a subset of ΩiRi(Ωi), inherits from
this sigma-algebra.
Definition III.2 (slice). Let Ω be an ES, f an SBVS and y ∈ Y.
We call slice of f by y the voting system fy defined as:
fy :
Ω → Cm
ω → f(y(R(ω))).
It is easily proved, but worth noticing, that if f meets the Condorcet crite-
rion, then so does fy. Indeed, if there is a Condorcet winner in ω, then she is
also Condorcet winner in y(R(ω)), since voters have the same binary relations
of preference in both situations.
6. Borda score of candidate c (for voter i): c gets one point for each candidate d such that
i prefers c to d, and half a point for each candidate that i judges incomparable of mutually
preferable to c. Then this score is divided by m− 1, in order to have a value in [0, 1].
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III.B Decomposable electoral space
Now, we introduce the notion of decomposability. The idea is the following:
by independently drawing r and y with suitable laws, we would like to recon-
stitute ω with the correct probability measure P. Interested readers can read
appendix B for more details about decomposability.
We will first give the formal definition, then an interpretation and an exam-
ple. Let us recall that µ denotes the law of R.
Definition III.3 (decomposability). Let (Ω,P) be a PES.
We say that (Ω,P) is R-decomposable, or just decomposable, iff there exists
a probability law ν over Y such that:
∀A ∈ τΩ,P(A) = (µ× ν){(r, y) ∈ R(Ω)× Y s.t. y(r) ∈ A}.
In the following, when (Ω,P) is decomposable, we will always note ν an
arbitrary measure over Y among those meeting the above condition.
This definition demands that P is the image measure of µ×ν by the operator
that, to r and y, associates y(r). So, by independently drawing r and y (with
measures µ and ν), then considering ω = y(r), we draw ω with the correct
probability measure P.
Example III.4 (yellow and blue voters). Let us consider n = 2 voters and
m = 2 candidates named A and B. Let us assume that the state of a voter is
the pair of a strict total order of preference and a complementary information,
“yellow” or “blue”.
In a real study case, these two colors might have specific meanings, like
“strongly prefers” and “somehow prefers”, but it does not matter for our present
purpose.
Let P be the law that draws with equal probability one of the two following
situations:
1. Each voter is in state A = (A  B, yellow);
2. Each voter is in state B = (B  A, blue).
To prove that this PES is decomposable, let us consider the measure ν that
surely draws two identical functions y1 and y2 that, to relation of preference
A  B, associate A; and to B  A associate B.
Drawing r = (r1, r2) with law µ, we have with equal probabilities r = (A 
B,A  B) or r = (B  A,B  A). Then, drawing y with the (deterministic)
law ν, we have with equal probability y(r) = (A,A) or y(r) = (B,B), which is
coherent with P.
In short, to “emulate” this PES (Ω,P), it is sufficient to draw (r1, r2) with law
µ (which is directly defined by P), draw (y1, y2) with law ν (which we exhibited),
then glue r and y together.
We conclude that this PES (Ω,P) is decomposable.
Generally, it is not straightforward to see whether an electoral space is de-
composable or not. Hence, we will give some sufficient or necessary conditions.
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Proposition III.5 (independence implies decomposability). Let (Ω,P) be a
PES.
If voters (ω1, . . . , ωn) are independent, then (Ω,P) is decomposable.
Proof. Cf. proposition B.3 (in appendix).
However, independence is not necessary for decomposability. Indeed, in
example III.4, voters are not independent: either they are both in state A, or
in state B. But, as we saw, the PES is decomposable.
Now, we examine another sufficient condition: when each space Ωi is, by
definition, constructed as a product Pi × Ii (where Pi ⊂ Rm), with random
variables R and I that are independent. We provide an example just after the
proposition.
Proposition III.6 (another sufficient condition for decomposability). Let n ∈
N \ {0} and m ∈ N \ {0}.
For each i ∈ Vn, let Pi be a subset of Rm, let (Ii, τIi) be a measurable set
and let Ωi = Pi × Ii. Let Ri be the function:
Ri :
Pi × Ii → Rm
(ri, Ii) → ri.
Let P be a probability measure over Ω =
∏
i∈Vn Ωi.
If the two random variables R = (R1, . . . , Rn) and I = (I1, . . . , In) are
independent, then (Ω,P) is decomposable.
Proof. To Ii ∈ Ii, we associate the function pii(Ii) ∈ Yi that consists of con-
catenating ri and Ii in order to reconstitute a state ωi:
pii(Ii) :
Pi → Ωi
ri →
(
pii(Ii)
)
(ri) = (ri, Ii).
To I ∈ I, we associate pi(I) = (pi1(I1), . . . , pin(In)) ∈ Y.
Then, denoting ξ the law of I, and ν the image measure of ξ by pi, measure
ν is suitable to prove decomposability.
However, this condition is not necessary. When the sets Ωi are defined as
products Pi × Ii (where Pi ⊂ Rm), it may be the case that random variables
R and I are not independent, but the space is decomposable anyway.
Indeed, in example III.4, if R = (A  B,A  B), then we know for sure that
I = (yellow, yellow), whereas if R = (B  A,B  A), then I = (blue, blue); so,
R and I are not independent. However, as we saw, the PES is decomposable.
As an example of proposition III.6, let us consider an electoral space where
each voter i’s state is constituted by a strict total order of preference ri over
the candidates, and an integer ki ∈ {0, . . . ,m}: the voter “approves” the first ki
candidates of her order of preference (whatever “approving” means exactly).
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Noting Sm the set of strict total orders over Cm, let µ be a probability law
over Smn: for each voter i, we draw a strict total order of preference. Let ξ
be a probability law over {0, . . . ,m}n: for each voter i, we draw the number of
candidates that she approves.
We draw a population by independently using µ for orders of preference and
ξ for approval numbers. Let us note that for µ as well as for ξ, voters may not
be independent. But drawings by µ and ξ are independent by assumption.
Then, according to proposition III.6, the PES is decomposable.
Let us finish with a more complex example, where the sufficient conditions
from propositions III.5 and III.6 are not met, but the PES is decomposable (as
it was already the case in the example III.4 of yellow and blue voters).
Noting Wm the set of strict weak orders over Cm, let µ be a probability law
over Wmn: for each voter i, we draw a strict weak order of preference. Let ξ be
a probability law over (Rm)n: for each voter, we draw m grades. We choose ξ
such that for any voter, her m grades are almost surely all different.
Given a strict weak order ri and a vector of grades (u1, . . . , um) ∈ Rm, we
build a state in the following way: if ri is a strict total order, we assign grades
to candidates in this order, from the greatest to the lowest; if there are ties (for
example between candidates of ranks k, k + 1, k + 2), then we assign them the
corresponding average grade (for example from the k-th to the k+ 2-th greatest
grades).
By design, this PES is decomposable.
Finally, we give a necessary condition for decomposability.
Proposition III.7 (necessary condition of decomposability). Let (Ω,P) be a
PES.
If it is decomposable, then for any subset of indexes V ∈ P(Vn), for any
(Ai)i∈V ∈
∏
i∈V τΩi , for any r = (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ R of positive probability:
P
(
(∀i ∈ V, ωi ∈ Ai)|R = r
)
= P
(
(∀i ∈ V, ωi ∈ Ai)|∀i ∈ V,Ri = ri
)
.
Proof. Cf. proposition B.4 (in appendix).
We can emit an intuitive interpretation: the process of reconstituting states
ωi of a subset V of voters from the only knowledge of their relations ri must be
doable independently of relations rj belonging to the other voters.
However, this condition is not sufficient to ensure decomposability, as shown
in appendix B.
III.C Slicing theorem
Now we prove our main result: if the probabilized electoral space is decom-
posable, then there is at least one slice that is at most as manipulable as the
original voting system.
The two following lemmas will get rid of some questions of measurability for
the main theorem.
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Lemma III.8 (measurability of functions depending on binary relations). Let
Ω be an MES. Let (E, τE) be a measurable set and g : Ω→ E.
We assume that g depends only on binary relations of preference:
∀(ω, ψ) ∈ Ω2, R(ω) = R(ψ)⇒ g(ω) = g(ψ).
Then g is measurable.
Proof. Since g depends only on R(ω), we may define h : (Rm)n → E such that
g = h ◦R. Since (Rm)n is endowed with the discrete measure, h is measurable;
and by definition of an electoral space, R is measurable. So, g = h ◦ R is
measurable.
Lemma III.9 (measurability of any slice). Let Ω an MES, f an SBVS and
y ∈ Y.
Then fy and Mfy are measurable.
Proof. Immediate consequence of previous lemma.
Now, we present a lemma that gives a central idea of the theorem: when we
are in situation y(r), then voting systems f and fy give the same result; but
for manipulators, their possibility of expression in fy are included in those they
have in f , so they have less power.
For example, let us consider a very specific situation ω where for each voter i,
her sincere vector of grades ui is the vector of Borda scores associated to ri. In ω,
if the Borda method is manipulable, then Range voting also is: manipulators
just have to use the same strategies they would use in the Borda method.
Lemma III.10 (manipulability of the slice). Let (Ω,P) be a decomposable PES
and f an SBVS.
Then, ∀(r, y) ∈ R(Ω)× Y:
fy is manipulable in y(r)⇒ f is manipulable in y(r).
In other words:
Mfy (y(r)) ≤Mf (y(r)).
Proof. Suppose that fy is manipulable in ω = y(r). By definition, ∃ψ ∈ Ω s.t.
fy(ψ) 6= fy(ω) and:
∀i ∈ Vn, ψi 6= ωi ⇒ fy(ψ) Ri(ωi) fy(ω).
Expanding the definition of y and fy and noting φ = y(R(ψ)), we have:
∀i ∈ Vn, ψi 6= ωi ⇒ f(φ) Ri(ωi) f(y(R(y(r)))).
Since R ◦ y = Id, we have:
∀i ∈ Vn, ψi 6= ωi ⇒ f(φ) Ri(ωi) f(ω).
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Let us remark that if ψi = ωi, then φi = yi(Ri(ψi)) = yi(Ri(ωi)) =
yi(Ri(yi(ri))) = yi(ri) = ωi. By contraposition, we have the implication
φi 6= ωi ⇒ ψi 6= ωi, which leads to:
∀i ∈ Vn, φi 6= ωi ⇒ f(φ) Ri(ωi) f(ω).
Hence, f is manipulable in ω towards φ.
Theorem III.11 (slicing). Let (Ω,P) be a PES and f an SBVS whose manip-
ulability rate is well defined (i.e. Mf is measurable).
If (Ω,P) is decomposable, then there exists y ∈ Y such that the slice of f by
y has a manipulability rate that is at most as high as f :
ρP(fy) ≤ ρP(f).
Proof. For any y ∈ Y, lemma III.9 ensures that Mfy is measurable. We have:
ρP(fy) =
∫
ω∈Ω
Mfy (ω)P(dω).
Since (Ω,P) is decomposable, we have by substitution:
ρP(fy) =
∫
(r,z)∈R(Ω)×Y
Mfy (z(r))(µ× ν)(dr, dz).
Fubini-Tonelli theorem gives:
ρP(fy) =
∫
r∈R(Ω)
(∫
z∈Y
Mfy (z(r))ν(dz)
)
µ(dr).
And, since Mfy (z(r)) does not depend on z:
ρP(fy) =
∫
r∈R(Ω)
Mfy (y(r))µ(dr).
Now, let us study the manipulability of f . Using decomposability and Fubini-
Tonelli theorem again, we have:
ρP(f) =
∫
y∈Y
(∫
r∈R(Ω)
Mf (y(r))µ(dr)
)
ν(dy).
Since (lemma III.10) we have Mf (y(r)) ≥Mfy (y(r)), we then deduce:
ρP(f) ≥
∫
y∈Y
(∫
r∈R(Ω)
Mfy (y(r))µ(dr)
)
ν(dy)
≥
∫
y∈Y
ρP(fy)ν(dy).
So, the manipulability rate of f is no less than the average of the manipula-
bility rates of the slices fy. Hence the result.
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Corollary III.12 (slicing for independent voters). Let (Ω,P) be a PES and f
an SBVS whose manipulability rate is well defined (i.e. Mf is measurable).
If the voters (ω1, . . . , ωn) are independent, then there exists y ∈ Y such that
ρP(fy) ≤ ρP(f).
Corollary III.13 (slicing for Condorcet voting systems). Let (Ω,P) be a PES
and f an SBVS whose manipulability rate is well defined (i.e. Mf is measur-
able).
If (Ω,P) is decomposable and if f meets the Condorcet criterion, then there
exists an SBVS f ′ such that:
• ρP(f ′) ≤ ρP(f);
• f ′ depends only on the binary relations of preference of the voters;
• f ′ meets the Condorcet criterion.
III.D Combining Condorcification and slicing theorems
Theorem III.14 (Condorcification and slicing). Let (Ω,P) be a PES and f an
SBVS (such that Mf and Mfc are measurable).
We assume that:
• (Ω,P) is decomposable;
• f meets the informed majority coalition criterion.
Then there exists an SBVS f ′ such that:
• ρP(f ′) ≤ ρP(f);
• f ′ depends only on the binary relations of preference;
• f ′ meets the Condorcet criterion.
Proof. By Condorcification theorem II.9, we know that ρP(f c) ≤ ρP(f). Apply-
ing slicing corollary III.13 to f c, we have a suitable f ′.
So, if the PES is decomposable and if we look for a voting system that is
as little manipulable as possible among those meeting the informed majority
coalition criterion, we can restrict our research to those of the following kind:
each voters gives only her binary relation of preference (not more information),
and the voting system meets the Condorcet criterion.
We are going to formalize that now.
Proposition III.15 (existence of an optimal Condorcet voting system). Let
Ω = Rmn be the electoral space of the binary relations for n and m. Let µ be a
probability measure over Ω.
Then, there exists an SBVS g such that:
• g meets the Condorcet criterion;
• And for any SBVS g′ meeting the Condorcet criterion, ρµ(g) ≤ ρµ(g′).
We say that g is ρµ-optimal among preferential Condorcet voting systems.
Proof. There are a finite number of functions g : Ω → Cm, a fortiori if we de-
mand that they meet the Condorcet criterion. So, as least one of them minimizes
ρµ(g).
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Theorem III.16 (general optimality of a preferential Condorcet voting sys-
tem). Let (n,m,Ω, τΩ, R,P) be a PES. As usual, we note µ the law of R.
In the electoral space of binary relations for n and m, let g : Rmn → Cm be
an SBVS that is ρµ-optimal among preferential Condorcet voting systems.
If (Ω,P) is decomposable, then for any SBVS f : Ω → Cm meeting the in-
formed majority coalition criterion (and such thatMf andMfc are measurable),
g ◦R is at most as manipulable as f :
ρP(g ◦R) ≤ ρP(f).
Proof. From lemma III.8, we know that Mg◦R is measurable. Hence, ρP(g ◦R)
is well defined.
By theorem III.14 (condorcification and slicing), we know that there exists
an SBVS f ′ that depends only on R(ω), meets the Condorcet criterion, and
such that ρP(f ′) ≤ ρP(f).
And since g is ρµ-optimal, we know that ρP(g ◦R) ≤ ρP(f ′).
In other words, g is optimal, not only among voting systems that depend
only on binary relations and that meet the Condorcet criterion, but among
the larger class of all voting systems that meet the informed majority coalition
criterion and that may depend on more information that the binary relations of
preference of the voters.
Finally, when the PES is decomposable, there exists, among the voting sys-
tems that meet the informed majority coalition criterion, one system or more
that minimize the manipulability rate. Among these, there exists at least one
that is only based on binary relations of preference and that meets the Condorcet
criterion.
As a consequence, in order to find a voting system that minimizes the manip-
ulability rate (among those meeting the informed majority coalition criterion),
we can restrict our investigation to those that depend only on the binary rela-
tions of preference and that meet the Condorcet criterion.
Conclusion
We have proved that when the probabilized electoral space is decomposable,
which is in particular true when voters are independent, for any voting system
f , at least one of its slices is at most as manipulable as f . A slice of f depends
only on binary relations of preference and when f meets the Condorcet criterion,
it does also.
Combined with Condorcification theorem from Durand et al. (2014) and
Green-Armytage et al. (2014), this proves that when searching for a voting
system whose manipulability is minimal among those meeting the informed
majority coalition criterion, one may restrict to those that depend only on binary
relations of preference and that meet the Condorcet criterion.
Since there are a finite number of such systems, this also proves that in
any decomposable culture, there exists a voting system whose manipulability is
minimal among those meeting the informed majority coalition criterion.
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A Notations
Electoral space
c r d Pair (c, d) belongs to binary relation r.
n ∈ N \ {0} Number of voters.
Vn Set {1, . . . , n} of the indexes of the voters.
m ∈ N \ {0} Number of candidates.
Cm Set {1, . . . ,m} of the indexes of the candidates.
Rm Set of binary relations over Cm.
R Set Rmn, used to represent the binary relations of all voters.
Ωi Set of possible states for voter i.
ωi ∈ Ωi State of voter i.
Ri
Measurable function Ωi → Rm that extracts, from voter i’s
state ωi, her binary relation of preference ri.
R
Measurable function Ω → R that extracts, from the state ω
of the whole population, the n-tuple (R1(ω1), . . . , Rn(ωn)).
Ω
Universe
∏
i∈Vn Ωi of possible states for the whole popula-
tion of voters. Also used as a shortcut for electoral space
(n,m,Ω, R) or measurable electoral space (n,m,Ω, τΩ, R).
Probabilized electoral space
τE A sigma-algebra over a set E.
P A probability measure over universe (Ω, τΩ).
P(A|B) Conditional probability of event A knowing B.
(Ω,P) Shortcut for probabilized electoral space (n,m,Ω, τΩ, R,P).
µ Probability law of R (under probability measure P).
Yi Set {yi : Ri(Ωi)→ Ωi s.t. Ri◦yi = Id} of right inverses of Ri.
Y Set ∏i∈Vn Yi.
ν A probability measure over space Y.
Voting system
f A state-based voting system (SBVS) f : Ω→ Cm.
f c Condorcification of f .
fy Slice of f by y.
Mf Manipulability indicator Ω→ {0, 1} of voting system f .
ρP(f) ∈ [0, 1] Manipulability rate of voting system f in culture P.
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B Decomposability
One dimension
We now prove the lemma of the complementary random variable, which
shows that a decomposition like in definition III.3 is always possible when there
is only one voter.
We have a probabilized space (Ω, τΩ,P) and a random variable X with values
in a finite measurable set (X , τX ) endowed with the discrete measure. We denote
µ the law of X.
When we realize the random experience, the state of the system is described
by ω. The value x = X(ω) is a partial information about this state: if we know
only x, we generally lack some information about ω. Let us imagine that there
exists a space Y that allows to express this additional piece of information: then,
the state can be expressed as the pair ω = (x, y).
In that case, we may consider y as a function from X to Ω: if one knows x,
then y allows to reconstitute state ω in its whole.
Let us imagine, moreover, that random variables x and y are independent:
this would allow to express the universe Ω as the product of probabilized sets X
and Y. It would be a considerable asset, as we have seen in the proof of slicing
theorem III.11.
The construction that we will consider is a generalization of this notion of
complementary information. Indeed, we have a very important freedom: we can
choose the set Y. For the sake of generality, we will always choose the set of
functions y : X(Ω)→ Ω that are coherent with R, in the sense that R ◦ y = Id.
Indeed, it is the general framework so that giving an x an a y perfectly defines
a state ω that is coherent with r.
Lemma B.1 (complementary random variable). Let (Ω, τΩ,P) be a probabilized
set and X a random variable, i.e. a measurable function from Ω to a measurable
set (X , τX ). We note µ the law of X.
We note Y = {y : X(Ω)→ Ω s.t. X ◦ y = Id}.
We assume that (X , τX ) is finite and endowed with the discrete measure.
Then there exists a measure ν over Y such that:
∀A ∈ τΩ,P(A) = (µ× ν){(x, y) ∈ X(Ω)× Y s.t. y(x) ∈ A}.
Proof. For any x ∈ X(Ω):
• If P(X = x) > 0, we note Px the measure of conditional probability
knowing X = x (restricted to X−1(x));
• If P(X = x) = 0, we choose7 an arbitrary ωx ∈ X−1(x) and we note Px
the probability measure that surely returns ωx.
Identifying a function y ∈ Y to the list of its values for each possible argu-
ment x, we define ν as the product measure of all Px.
7.There is no “axiom of choice” issue because we do a finite number of choices.
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Then for A ∈ τΩ:
(µ× ν){(x, y) s.t. y(x) ∈ A} =
∑
x∈X(Ω)
µ{x} · ν{y(x) ∈ A}
=
∑
P(X=x)>0
P(X = x) · P(A|X = x)
= P(A).
We thank Anne-Laure Basdevant and Arvind Singh for fruitful discussions
about this lemma.
Several dimensions
Now, we deal with decomposability in the general case.
Let n ∈ N \ {0}. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let (Ωi, τΩi) be a measurable set,
(Xi, τXi) a finite set endowed with the discrete measure and Xi a measurable
function:
Xi :
Ωi → Xi
ωi → Xi(ωi).
Let (Ω, τΩ) =
∏n
i=1(Ωi, τΩi) and (X , τX ) =
∏n
i=1(Xi, τXi) the product measur-
able sets, endowed with their product sigma-algebras.
The universe (Ω, τΩ) is endowed8 with a probability measure P. We note X
the random variable that, to ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn), associates (X1(ω1)), . . . , Xn(ωn)).
We note µ the law of X.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we note Yi = {yi : Xi(Ωi) → Ωi s.t. Xi ◦ yi = Id}
the set of right inverses of Xi, endowed with its canonical sigma-algebra (defined
as in notation III.1). We note (Y, τY) =
∏n
i=1(Yi, τYi) the product measurable
space, endowed with the product measure.
For x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X(Ω) and y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Y, we note y(x) =
(y1(x1), . . . , yn(xn)) ∈ Ω.
Definition B.2 (decomposability in general). We say that (Ω,P) isX-decomposable
iff there exists a measure ν over Y such that:
∀A ∈ τΩ,P(A) = (µ× ν){(x, y) ∈ X(Ω)× Y s.t. y(x) ∈ A}.
The difficulty comes from our demand for complementary random variables
yi that are individual : y may not be any function from X(Ω) to Ω, but a n-tuple
of functions, where each yi is from Xi(Ωi) to Ωi. Indeed, we need individual
random variables for the proof of lemma III.10.
If we asked a collective random variable y that, from x, allows to reconstitute
ω with the correct probability law, it would always be possible, as a direct
consequence of lemma B.1.
8. It should be noticed that the ωi’s may not be independent (the same is true for the
Xi’s).
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Proposition B.3 (independence implies decomposability). If the random vari-
ables (ω1, . . . , ωn) are independent, then (Ω,P) is X-decomposable.
Proof. Simply apply lemma B.1 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, which defines a measure
νi over each set Yi. Then, define ν as the product measure of the νi’s.
Proposition B.4 (a necessary condition for decomposability). If (Ω,P) is X-
decomposable then, for each set of indexes V ∈ P({1, . . . , n}), for each (Ai)i∈V ∈∏
i∈V τΩi , for each x = (x1, . . . , xn) of positive probability:
P
(
(∀i ∈ V, ωi ∈ Ai)|X = x
)
= P
(
(∀i ∈ V, ωi ∈ Ai)|∀i ∈ V,Xi = xi
)
. (3)
Proof. On one hand:
P
(
(∀i ∈ V, ωi ∈ Ai)|X = x
)
= (µ× ν)((∀i ∈ V, Yi(xi) ∈ Ai)|X = x)
= ν(∀i ∈ V, Yi(xi) ∈ Ai).
On the other hand, it is easy to show similarly that:
P
(
(∀i ∈ V, ωi ∈ Ai)|∀i ∈ V,Xi = xi
)
= ν(∀i ∈ V, Yi(xi) ∈ Ai).
However, condition (3) does not ensure that (Ω,P) is X-decomposable.
As a counterexample, let us take n = 2. The variable ωi (with i = 1 or
i = 2) may take 4 values, noted ω(1)i to ω
(4)
i . The variable Xi may take 2 values,
x
(a)
i and x
(b)
i . The following table gives the correspondence between the ωi’s
and the xi’s, as well as measure P.
P ω(1)1 → x(a)1 ω(2)1 → x(a)1 ω(3)1 → x(b)1 ω(4)1 → x(b)1
ω
(1)
2 → x(a)2 116 116 18 0
ω
(2)
2 → x(a)2 116 116 0 18
ω
(3)
2 → x(b)2 18 0 0 18
ω
(4)
2 → x(b)2 0 18 18 0
It is easily checked that condition (3) is met. Indeed, for example:
P(ω(1)1 |x(a)1 & x(a)2 ) =
1
2
= P(ω(1)1 |x(a)1 ).
Now, let us suppose that (Ω,P) is X-decomposable. Let ν be a suitable
measure for this decomposition. For (α, β, γ, δ) ∈ {1, 2}×{3, 4}×{1, 2}×{3, 4},
let us note:
ν(α, β, γ, δ) = ν
(
y1(x
(a)
1 ) = ω
(α)
1 & y1(x
(b)
1 ) = ω
(β)
1 & y2(x
(a)
2 ) = ω
(γ)
2 & y2(x
(b)
2 ) = ω
(δ)
2
)
.
We notice the following facts.
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• 0 = P(ω(3)1 & ω(3)2 |x(b)1 & x(b)2 ) =
∑
(α,γ) ν(α, 3, γ, 3). Since all terms in
this sum are nonnegative, we have in particular ν(1, 3, 1, 3) = 0.
• 0 = P(ω(1)1 & ω(4)2 |x(a)1 & x(b)2 ) =
∑
(β,γ) ν(1, β, γ, 4) hence ν(1, 3, 1, 4) = 0
and ν(1, 4, 1, 4) = 0.
• 0 = P(ω(4)1 & ω(1)2 |x(b)1 & x(a)2 ) =
∑
(α,δ) ν(α, 4, 1, δ) hence ν(1, 4, 1, 3) = 0.
So, 14 = P(ω
(1)
1 & ω
(1)
2 |x(a)1 & x(a)2 ) =
∑
(β,δ) ν(1, β, 1, δ) = ν(1, 3, 1, 3) +
ν(1, 3, 1, 4) + ν(1, 4, 1, 3) + ν(1, 4, 1, 4) = 0: this contradiction proves that (Ω,P)
is not decomposable.
In fact, in this counterexample, it can be shown that there exists a signed
measure ν that meets the usual relations for decomposition. However, it is
not enough for us: indeed, the proof of slicing theorem III.11 uses the growth
property of integration, which is based on its positivity property.
C Attempts of generalization for the
slicing theorem
Remark C.1 (failure of generalization to inclusion). In slicing theorem III.11,
instead of having a voting system f ′ = fy such that ρP(f ′) ≤ ρP(f) for a specific
culture P, it would be stronger to have an inclusion:
{ω ∈ Ω s.t. f ′ is manipulable in ω} ⊆ {ω ∈ Ω s.t. f is manipulable in ω}.
Indeed, this would lead to decrease the manipulability rate for any culture P.
Since this generalization seems difficult, we will strengthen our assumptions
and weaken our demands.
• We assume that f meets the Condorcet criterion.
• We still demand that f ′ depends only on binary relations of preference.
• We only demand that f ′ meets the informed majority coalition criterion
(which is a weaker requirement than f ′ being a slice of f , given our as-
sumption that f meets the Condorcet criterion).
Unfortunately, we will prove that such an f ′ does not always exist.
First, we remark that if such an f ′ exists, then by Condorcification theorem
II.9, we can demand that f ′ meets the Condorcet criterion.
Let us consider n = 3 voters and m = 3 candidates A,B,C. The electoral
space is defined as follows. The state of each voter is given by a strict order
of preference and a bit with value 0 or 1. Here is the voting system f that we
consider:
• If there is a Condorcet winner, she is elected;
• If there is none, if at least two bits are 1 then C is elected, otherwise (i.e.
if at least two bits are 0) B is elected.
Now, let us consider the three following situations.
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Situation
Voter
Condorcet winner
1 2 3
ω
A
C
B
, 0
B
C
A
, 1
C
A
B
, 1 C
φ
A
B
C
, 1
B
A
C
, 0
C
A
B
, 1 A
ψ
A
B
C
, 0
B
C
A
, 0
C
B
A
, 1 B
f is not manipulable in ω. On one hand, to manipulate in favor of B,
only the second voter is interested, the others stay sincere. But then, B stays
Condorcet loser so, since there are three victories in the matrix of duels, there is
a Condorcet winner (who is not B). On the other hand, to manipulate in favor
of A, the first voter may try to make the situation appear as without Condorcet
winner. But then, there will always be two bits equal to 1, so the winner will
be C and the manipulation will fail.
Similarly, it can be shown that f is manipulable neither in φ nor in ψ.
Now, if f ′ depends only on binary relations of preference and meets the
Condorcet criterion, let us consider the following family of situations χ, where
the bits of each voters do not matter for f ′.
Situation
Voter
Condorcet winner
1 2 3
χ
A
B
C
B
C
A
C
A
B
None
If f ′(χ) = A (resp. B, C), then f ′ is manipulable in ω (resp. φ, ψ) towards χ.
Hence, f ′ must be manipulable in at least one of the three situations ω, φ, ψ,
so f ′ can not meet the desired properties.
So, it seems that in general, we will not have better than ρP(f ′) ≤ ρP(f) for
a specific culture P.
Remark C.2 (decomposability is important). That said, we may ask whether
slicing theorem III.11 holds true when removing the condition of decomposabil-
ity (and without another assumption to replace it). But it does not.
Indeed, consider the example of previous remark and the probability measure
P(ω) = P(φ) = P(ψ) = 13 . Then, the initial voting system f has a manipulability
rate equal to 0 (f is manipulable in some situations, but they come with zero
probability). However, any SBVS f ′ that depends only on binary relations
of preference and that meets the informed majority coalition criterion has a
manipulability rate no lower than 13 .
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Remark C.3 (finding a weaker condition than decomposability). At last, we
may wonder whether slicing theorem III.11 holds true with an assumption that
is weaker than decomposability, for example the one presented in proposition
III.7. We do not know if it is the case, and that is an interesting lead for future
work.
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